Paretian Intergenerational Discounting
Dexter Samidat and DavidA. Weisbachtt
This paper arguesthat discountingcosts and benefits of projects for the opportunity costs of
capital Pareto dominates decision criteria that do not discount. It considers and rejects several
objections to the Pareto dominance argument, including the problem of making compensating
transfersfor the costs and benefits of projects and whether taking opportunitycosts into account is
different than discounting.It also argues that discounting future costs and benefits of projects does
not undervaluefuture generations.
INTRODUCTION

The problem presented by intergenerational discounting is well

known. Suppose we are going to engage in a project that creates costs
and benefits that are separated over a long period of time. The most
common examples are global warming and disposal of nuclear waste,
but the problem extends to any project that affects more than one
period, future or past. How are we to compare the costs and benefits?
In private projects, costs and benefits are always discounted because

of the opportunity cost of capital. But if we discount public projects
over long periods of time, future lives can seem to be significantly undervalued compared to present lives. With a sufficiently high discount
rate or a sufficiently long time period, future lives will seem to have a
value vastly lower than present lives.

Much of the discussion of discounting is driven by the intuitive
implausibility of such comparisons. The power of discounting over
long periods can astonish even those deeply familiar with the concept.'
It is easy to construct examples where saving a single life today means

allowing most of the world to perish at some date in the future. In one
of our favorite quips, two commentators ask you to "[i]magine finding
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1 See, for example, Martin L. Weitzman, "JustKeep Discounting,But...", in Paul R. Portney and John P. Weyant, eds, Discountingand IntergenerationalEquity 23, 28 (Resources for the
Future 1999). Suppose we have a chess board and begin by putting a single penny on the first
square. In each subsequent square, we double what was in the previous square, so that the second
square has two cents; the third, four cents; and so on. It would be impossible to finish this game
because the last square would have to have more wealth than exists in the world today. More
realistic but less dramatic examples show that with modest discount rates and time horizons, say
5 percent and two hundred years, a saving of billions in the future is worth sacrificing only thousands of lives today.
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out that you, having just reached your twenty-first birthday, must soon
die of cancer because one evening Cleopatra wanted an extra helping
of dessert."2 The implication is that no moral theory can support allowing your death to satisfy Cleopatra's sweet tooth. Commentators
frequently compare a global catastrophe in the distant future with
trivial costs today. These types of comparisons create unease with discounting, even among economists.
The intuitions driving these examples and, indeed, even the very

mathematics of these examples are incorrect. We argue here that discounting is appropriate and, in fact, required by any moral theory that
accepts the Pareto principle. In particular, under plausible conditions,
discounted cost-benefit analysis Pareto dominates any other decision
procedure. Although this argument is well known, it has been subject
to incorrect criticisms and not fully appreciated. Substantial movements in environmental law, such as the sustainable development
movement, argue for decision criteria that are Pareto dominated, and
economists, lawyers, and philosophers frequently argue for a zero discount rate even while seeming to accept the Pareto principle
Although Pareto arguments do not necessarily need it, we place
the argument within the context of a welfarist, consequentialist ethic
and discuss how it relates to the optimal taxation arguments derived
from that ethic. In particular, optimal tax theory can be used to show
that under reasonable conditions, cost-benefit analysis should not be
weighted to consider distributional issues, regardless of how egalitar-

2
Tyler Cowen and Derek Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate, in Peter Laslett and
James S. Fishkin, eds, Justice Between Age Groups and Generations144,145 (Yale 1992).
3
See Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Pricingthe Priceless:Cost-BenefitAnalysis of
Environmental Protection, 150 U Pa L Rev 1553, 1571 (2002) (comparing the death of a billion
people in five hundred years to the death of a single person today); Geoffrey Heal, Valuing the
Future: Economic Theory and Sustainability 13 (Columbia 1998) (comparing the world GNP in
two hundred years to the price of a used car today and, based on the implausibility of this comparison, developing a book-length formalization of the theory of sustainable development). See
also Graciela Chichilnisky, An Axiomatic Approach to Sustainable Development, 13 Soc Choice
& Welfare 231, 233-34 (1996) (developing a formal theory of sustainable development from the
intuition that discounting is inappropriate).
4
See Paul R. Portney and John P. Weyant, Introduction,in Portney and Weyant, eds, Discounting and IntergenerationalEquity 1, 5 (cited in note 1) ("[Il]t is impossible to read these papers without getting a sense of the unease even the best minds in the profession feel about discounting.").
5
See, for example, Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis,
and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 Colum L Rev 941,1005-06 (1999) (arguing that utilitarian
principles are inconsistent with discounting); Tyler Cowen, Consequentialism Implies a Zero Rate of
IntergenerationalDiscount,in Laslett and Fishkin, eds, Justice Between Age Groups and Generations
162, 162 (cited in note 2) (arguing that the adoption of four axioms, one of which is Pareto indifference, inevitably leads to the conclusion that a consequentialist viewpoint requires a zero intergenerational rate of discount); Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons 357 (Oxford 1984) (arguing that the
social discount rate is "indefensible" because remoteness in time has no moral significance).
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ian the decisionmaker. We discuss the conditions for this theorem and
whether they are met in the intergenerational context.
The Paretian arguments made here relate only to opportunity
costs or the productivity of capital. Therefore, we do not consider pure
time-preference arguments for discounting, such as impatience, uncertainty, and the like. Many arguments against discounting focus on
whether it is ethical to consider pure time preference. 6 We express no
opinion on these arguments here. Moreover, because the arguments
are based on the Pareto criteria, we need not consider explicitly
whether future generations are likely to be better off or worse off
than is the current generation, although the optimal taxation framework can incorporate these considerations.'
Part I lays out the basic problem and framework for addressing it.
Because the arguments about discounting are about justice between
generations, we take generations as the basic unit for measuring Pareto
improvements rather than arguing about the welfare of each and every
individual within each generation across all of time. Part I discusses this
approach. Part II considers the argument that discounted cost-benefit
analysis Pareto dominates any other decision criteria and discusses
how this argument relates to the optimal taxation arguments. Part III
considers the major objections to the Pareto argument. In particular,
Part III considers the problem of making intergenerational transfers,
such as when there are intervening generations, and assesses whether
considerations of opportunity costs are distinct from discounting. Section IV briefly addresses additional issues, including the use of rhetoric in discounting arguments.
I. THE PROBLEM AND THE ETHICAL FRAMEWORK

Suppose there is a potential project that has costs and benefits
dispersed over a long period of time. One of the most important examples is the abatement of global warming. Reducing global warming
requires the current generation to incur substantial costs while producing benefits hundreds of years into the future. Other prominent
examples include nuclear waste disposal and extinction of species. The
problem, however, is general and runs in both directions (that is, costs
today, benefits in the future or benefits today, costs in the future). For
example, rather than saving resources today to help the future, we
6
See, for example, Revesz, 99 Colum L Rev at 998 (cited in note 5) ("The possible justifications for discounting for time preference at a positive rate are not compelling.").
7
The opportunity cost argument implicitly includes considerations of relative wealth
because if capital is productive, giving rise to opportunity costs, future generations are likely to
be wealthier than we are.
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could consider the inverse: a project that uses resources today to help
current lives when those resources might otherwise have been used in
the future. Using up the world's petroleum supplies is such a case, as is
not engaging in global warming abatement. By merely switching the
assumed status quo, we can imagine any project running in either direction. By "project" we mean any decision that imposes costs and
benefits, including actual projects such as building things, regulatory
projects that impose costs and benefits over time, research into new
technologies, taxing, saving, running deficits or surpluses, or any other
decision that has real world effects.
It is important to note that projects (and decisions about discounting) can involve the past as well as the future. A good example is
the measurement of reparations for harms that occurred long ago. We
might, in the case of reparations for slavery, compensate harms that
occurred as long as three or four hundred years ago. Discounting can
have an enormous impact on the size of reparations claims.
The project will either pass or fail discounted cost-benefit analysis. By this we mean that the marginal costs are either less or more
than the marginal benefits when all costs and all benefits are discounted (by an appropriate discount rate, which is discussed in Part
IV) to the same time period. Note that because projects can involve
either preserving or destroying resources, if one is a committed environmentalist, one cannot say whether passing or failing discounted
cost-benefit analysis helps or hurts the environment. If the project is
reparations, discounting increases the transfers to the harmed group
and failing to discount reduces the transfers.8 Moreover, there is no
difference, so far, between discounting to the present period and future valuing to some future period if the same discount rate is used.
All that is required is that the marginal costs and benefits be compared at the same point in time. (A discussion of the possible differences between discounting and taking opportunity costs into account
can be found in Part III.C below.)
We also assume that all of the project's costs and benefits are
properly counted. There are many discussions in the literature about
the inadequacies of various discounting or cost-benefit procedures
used in practice.9 While these issues are important, they are not central
8 For example, suppose that the harm to each slave was $1000 at the time and the harms
occurred 250 years ago. With no discounting, reparations would be $1000 per harm (in constant
dollars). With discounting, at a 5 percent rate, reparations would be almost $200 million per harm.
9 See, for example, Ackerman and Heinzerling, 150 U Pa L Rev at 1563-70 (cited in note
3) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis is inherently unreliable because not all benefits of potential
government regulations can be monetized); Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Implementing
Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J Legal Stud 1105, 1112-16 (2000)
(arguing that traditional cost-benefit analysis includes certain factors, such as moral preferences,
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to the underlying ethical issue of whether discounting is appropriate.
We also assume that the value of life (and nonlife harms) is properly
measured, and that life, risks to life, and enjoyment of life can be
measured in money.' This means, among other things, that if the value
of life in the future is higher than it is today (say because of increased
wealth), this higher value is used. Whether life or enjoyment can be
measured with money is an interesting problem, but it is orthogonal to
the issues presented by discounting because it arises as well for projects that have immediate effects."
More generally, we will not discuss here whether cost-benefit
analysis is appropriate for projects that have only current costs and
benefits.'2 In trying to understand objections to discounting, we think
that many of the objections are to cost-benefit analysis generally and
not about discounting as a distinct issue.'3 Although we personally
would use cost-benefit analysis to evaluate projects, readers skeptical
of this analysis should view our arguments as distinct from the debate

on that issue. That is, we think that discounting is a related but distinct
consideration from cost-benefit analysis."
in the calculation of individual welfare even though such factors may be irrelevant to the individual's well-being); Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108 Yale L J 1911, 1911-15 (1999) (criticizing methods of discounting that equate human lives with pure dollar values).
10 See Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Dollarsand Death,72 U Chi L Rev 537,542 (2005)
(recommending changes to current administrative and judicial value-of-life assessment methods).
11 Many counterarguments to discounting rely on an intuition that the value of life cannot
be measured. They implicitly compare spending money to the certain loss of life. See, for example, Cowen and Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate at 144-45 (cited in note 2). These examples trigger intuitions not only by the exponential effect of discounting but also by the difference
between willingness to pay and willingness to accept. This confounding of intuitions regarding
separate issues (that is, discounting on the one hand, and whether life can be measured with
money on the other) can create erroneous conclusions regarding either one of the issues.
12 There is an extensive literature on this topic. See, for example, the various conference
papers in Cost-BenefitAnalysis: Legal, Economic,and PhilosophicalPerspectives,29 J Legal Stud
837,837-1177 (2000).
13 See, for example, Ackerman and Heinzerling, 150 U Pa L Rev at 1553, 1559 (cited in
note 3) (objecting to cost-benefit analysis as applied to environmental regulations and explaining
discounting as an essential feature of cost-benefit analysis); Heinzerling, 108 Yale L J at 1913-15
(cited in note 9) (objecting to the use of discounting on the grounds that any quantitative comparisons involving human beings obscure important decisional issues); Thomas 0. McGarity and
Sidney A. Shapiro, OSHA's Critics and Regulatory Reform, 31 Wake Forest L Rev 587, 629 (1996)
("For very highly valued things that are not traded in the actual marketplace, cost-benefit analysis
is, at its core, 'incoherent' or 'schizophrenic' because it cannot yield a single numerical value.").
14 In particular, it is possible to accept cost-benefit analysis while rejecting discounting.
Although few authors are explicit about this, it seems to reflect the views of Professors Revesz
and Lind. See Revesz, 99 Colum L Rev at 947-48 (cited in note 5) (rejecting discounting as
applied to the valuation of harms to future generations while proposing new parameters to
measure costs and benefits in regards to intergenerational obligations); Robert C. Lind, Analysis
for IntergenerationalDecisionmaking,in Portney and Weyant, eds, Discounting and Intergenerational Equity 173, 174 (cited in note 1) (contending that the use of discounting to decide whether
or not to transfer resources from present generations to future ones is irrelevant because the
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How are we to evaluate this project? Our arguments below rely
on the Pareto criteria-we argue that discounted cost-benefit analysis
produces results that are Pareto superior to any other decision criteria, at least in most contexts. Pareto superiority is traditionally defined in terms of individuals; Pareto superiority would require that
each and every individual throughout time is equal or better off with
discounting. We apply the term to generations rather than individuals.
We show below that each generation, however defined, is equal or
better off. Particular individuals within a generation, however, may be
better or worse off.
We take this approach for several reasons. First, the relevant actors in discounting debates are usually, if not always, generations. The
debates are about justice between generations, not about redistribution within a generation. Moreover, each generation is, to a large extent, in charge of redistribution within that generation, perhaps favoring extensive redistribution, perhaps not. Giving each generation
more total resources makes whatever distributive decisions it wants to
make easier. Some might argue that we should not engage in a project
that, relative to the status quo, changes the distribution of wealth
within a generation, but this privileges the status quo. Moreover, it is
not even clear in the abstract whether the alteration would be for the
better or the worse or how it would interact with that generation's
plans and ideals. Thus, we think the best approach is to think of Pareto
superiority as applied to generations.
We can also frame the problem in the context of broader ethical
principles. Schelling noted that the costs and benefits of long-term
projects are imposed on different individuals whose lives may be
largely unconnected." For example, global warming abatement may
very well impose costs on the United States and create benefits for
future generations of foreigners living in low-lying countries such as
Bangladesh. Similarly, using up resources today may transfer resources in the opposite direction, taking resources from those future

decision is ultimately an ethical one). See also Heal, Valuing the Future at 13 (cited in note 3)
(observing that societies devote resources to projects that are not justified by the use of traditional discount rates and, as a result, new economic models are necessary to explain these decisions); Cowen, Consequentialism Implies a Zero Rate of IntergenerationalDiscount at 162 (cited

in note 5) (arguing that the consequentialist perspective dictates a zero intergenerational rate of
discount when conducting a comparison of costs and benefits). Many discussions rejecting discounting, particularly in the legal literature, are found in broader examinations of cost-benefit
analysis, and it is not clear whether the authors view the subjects as distinct. See, for example,
Ackerman and Heinzerling, 150 U Pa L Rev at 1570-73 (cited in note 3); McGarity and Shapiro,
31 Wake Forest L Rev at 629-30 (cited in note 13).
15

Thomas C. Schelling, IntergenerationalDiscounting,23 Energy Policy 395,395-96 (1995).
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foreigners and transferring them to today's Americans.'6 The same is
true if one analyzes projects with purely domestic consequences. One
must still weigh the relevant costs and benefits to different, usually unrelated, individuals. Any analysis of the problem must take into consideration whether such a transfer is desirable. As Schelling argued, global
warming abatement is as much a foreign aid problem as an environmental problem.'7
A welfarist-consequentialist determines whether such a transfer
is desirable by reference to the social welfare function. The transfer is
desirable if social welfare increases because of the transfer. The difficulty with using such an analysis here is that we must decide whom to
include in the social welfare function and at what weight. Utilitarianism and other forms of consequentialist reasoning do not answer this
question directly. A broader ethical framework is needed.
The issues of transferring resources among nations and among
generations are in fact distinct. We tend to be much more altruistic to
our heirs than to strangers. For example, a recent study shows that
current U.S. foreign policies have an implicit weight on the life of a
foreigner as low as 1/2000 of the life of an American. 8 At the same
time, most generations have left the world richer than they found it,
implying that we value our heirs' lives highly. These behaviors, however, even if robust, may not comply with ethical precepts."
In this paper, we will weight future lives the same as current lives.
We assume the equal moral worth of all individuals, today and in the
future. In particular, we assume that future lives enter into the social
welfare function in exactly the same way current lives do. This means
that we weight increases (and decreases) in well-being of a future individual exactly the same as an equivalent increase (or decrease) in
the well-being of a currently living individual. We do not discount

16 The whole notion of taking from one and giving to another requires a set of baseline
entitlements that, in turn, may assume an ethical theory. We use this language and its implicit
acceptance of the status quo for convenience and do not base our analysis on any assumption of
baseline entitlements.
17 See Schelling, 23 Energy Policy at 396 (cited in note 15) ("What we are talking about is
very much like a foreign aid program, with some of the foreigners being our own descendants
who live not on another continent but in another century.").
18
See Wojciech Kopczuk, Joel Slemrod, and Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Limitations of Decentralized World Redistribution'AnOptimal Taxation Approach, 40 Eur Econ Rev 1051,1054 (2005).
19 The same is true with respect to studies showing hyperbolic or other forms of irrational
discounting of the future. See Maureen Cropper and David Laibson, The Implications of Hyperbolic Discountingfor Project Evaluation, in Portney and Weyant, eds, Discounting and Intergenerational Equity 163, 164 (cited in note 1). Such studies do not show anything about ethical behavior toward the future.
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well-being."' We choose to weight future lives equally because many of
the discussions of discounting implicitly use this premise. 1 Pure equality may merely be a focal point, and it is not consistent with behavior
with respect to cross-nation programs, but it is, nevertheless, likely to
be the least objectionable choice.
Note that weighting individuals equally in a social welfare function does not mean equality of treatment. For example, if marginal
utility declines with wealth or the social welfare function is concave,

we will want to transfer resources from the rich to the poor. The reason is not unequal weighting. Instead, it is that overall social welfare
may increase with such a transfer.
This may be true with respect to projects. If the project transfers
from the poorer to the richer, the decline in utility of the poorer may
be more than the gain in the utility of the richer. Thus, even if the project passes discounted cost-benefit analysis in absolute dollar terms, it
may not increase social welfare. Similarly, if the project fails costbenefit analysis but redistributes from richer to poorer, it might increase social welfare. Every progressive tax system looks like this. Be-

cause of the deadweight loss of taxation, less money is transferred to
the poor than is taken from the rich, but the tax may still be desirable.
A central point in our approach to the problem is the difference
between discounting lives and discounting costs and benefits. As

noted, increments to well-being are counted the same for current and
20 There is a significant body of literature on whether future generations should count less
when we compute social welfare. In particular, commentators distinguish between a pure rate of
time preference that determines how units of utility should be compared across periods, and an
interest-like factor that depends on the rate of growth in the economy (and on the marginal utility
of consuming the growing GDP in each period). See Geoffrey Heal, Discounting:A Review of the
Basic Economics,74 U Chi L Rev at 59,63 (2007) ("A very important distinction ... is between the
rate [ I at which utility is discounted, also known as the ... pure rate of time preference, and the
rate at which consumption is discounted. The latter rate is sometimes called the social discount
rate."); Revesz, 99 Colum L Rev at 997 (cited in note 5) (unpacking the discount rate into a time
preference term and a return on capital term). We assume that the pure rate of time preference
is zero, so that all individuals, present or future, count equally.
Many of the arguments against discounting use the rhetoric of "discounting lives" in apparent reference to the pure rate of time preference. See, for example, Heinzerling, 108 Yale L J at
1912 (cited in note 9) ("Discounting lives is all about the relative worth of lives today versus lives
tomorrow."). Assuming that lives count equally in the social calculus, however, says little about
whether costs and benefits should be discounted for opportunity costs.
21 See Victor R. Fuchs and Richard Zeckhauser, Valuing Health-A "Priceless" Commodity, 77 Am Econ Rev 263, 265 (1987) ("Most policy planning discussions assume full altruismfuture citizens are given equal weight with present citizens.").
22
The situation is even more complex than the text implies. It is possible to show that
horizontal equity-equal treatment of equals-is inconsistent with welfarist-consequentialism.
See Anthony B. Atkinson and Joseph E. Stiglitz, Lectures on Public Economics 354 (McGrawHill 1980) (discussing conditions under which welfare may be increased though identical individuals are treated differently).
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future generations. Nevertheless, this does not mean that costs and
benefits should not be discounted. Consider the principle example
used by Richard Revesz." He posits a two-generation world where
one generation lives from years 1 through 50 and the other from years
51 through 100. There are 100 units to divide between the generations.
Revesz assumes no productivity, which at least potentially translates
into a zero discount rate, but supposes that there is otherwise an opportunity cost of funds, and that the discount rate is 3 percent.
Revesz posits that equal treatment of the two generations means
that each should get 50 units of resources. He argues:
In the absence of discounting for time preference, each individual
would be allocated 50 units of resources. In the face of a positive
rate of time preference, however, even a relatively modest one,
the first individual would get the bulk of the resources. It would
be difficult to construct an attractive ethical theory that privileged the first individual in this manner merely because she lived
fifty years earlier than the second individual.'
An alternative version of equality would give the first generation
approximately 80 units and the rest to the second generation (giving
each one an endowment of that amount in the first year of its life).
When the second generation's endowment of 20 is invested at 3 percent for the first 50 years, it will grow to about 80 units in year 51, generating an equal division of the resources.
A social welfare function that weighs each generation equally
would require the 80/20 split rather than the 50/50 split. The reason why
is that, with a 50/50 split, the second generation would have more total
consumption. If its 50 unit endowment is invested until the time that
generation is born, it will be able to consume about 220 units, compared
to the 50 units consumed by the first generation. If equality is valued,
there are welfare gains from transferring resources from the second
generation to the first until the marginal utility of consumption of each
generation is the same, which means that the endowment would be split
80/20. We adopt this latter concept of equality- intergenerational equity requires each generation to have the same marginal utility of conSee Revesz, 99 Colum L Rev at 998 (cited in note 5).
Id. We should note that there is an important ambiguity in his argument. The example
assumes zero productivity and, therefore, no opportunity costs of capital. He is explicitly discussing only pure time preference, which involves items other than pure opportunity costs, such as
impatience, that might affect the discount rate. In such a case, our analysis is consistent with his.
Revesz, however, believes that taking opportunity costs into account is different from discounting, and that opportunity costs should be taken into account. Id at 1007-09. If so, he should agree
with the conclusions in the text, although it is not clear that he would. The example, therefore, by
assuming a zero rate of productivity, while technically correct, has the potential to confuse.
23

24
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sumption (or absolute utility, depending on our social welfare function). That is, we care about equality of well-being while those arguing
against discounting are arguing for an equal division of current resources, which will inevitably lead to an inequality in well-being."
Much of the literature confounds these two topics: discounting
individuals' lives on the one hand and discounting costs and benefits
on the other, if not technically, at least rhetorically. For example, Cowen
consequentialism implies a
argues, using an axiomatic approach, that
26
zero rate of intergenerational discount. Nothing in his argument, however, is inconsistent with discounting costs and benefits by their opportunity costs, and his claim that there should be a zero rate of intergenerational discount should not be taken to mean that costs and
benefits of projects should not be discounted! All he is arguing for is
that each generation has equal weight in the social welfare function, a
result entirely consistent with the approach taken here. Similarly, concerns that discounting for time is equivalent to discounting the future
lives are misplaced. The two concepts are distinct.
II. DISCOUNTED COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS PARETO DOMINATES
ANY OTHER DECISION CRITERIA

In this Part, we show that discounted cost-benefit analysis (unweighted for distributional issues) Pareto dominates any other decision criteria, at least under likely scenarios. Although these arguments
are, to some extent, known, we lay them out in more detail than usual in
order to explore underlying assumptions. As noted, the arguments
made here are purely arguments about opportunity costs. In Part III we
discuss whether and to what extent these arguments are distinct from
other types of discounting. We consider here two cases: first, a project
that fails discounted cost-benefit analysis but that seems attractive for
distributional reasons, and second, a project that passes cost-benefit
analysis but that seems unattractive for distributional reasons.
Consider the case where a project fails discounted cost-benefit
analysis. That is, the discounted marginal costs exceed the discounted
marginal benefits. The project may still improve social welfare because
of the distribution of the costs and benefits. For example, it might impose costs on the rich and endow the poor with benefits. Nevertheless,

25 There are a variety of ways we can view equality, and the question "equality of what?" is
important. See, for example, Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined 12-30 (Harvard 1992). We do
not think, however, that Revesz's version of equality-that is, equality of initial allocations-is a
plausible one.
26

See Cowen, Consequentialism Implies a Zero Rate of IntergenerationalDiscount at 162

(cited in note 5).
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we should not engage in the project because there will always be another project that is a Pareto improvement.
Suppose, for example, that a project will impose costs today and
help a future generation. Given a valuation of life for today and in the
future (which may differ because willingness to pay for life may increase as wealth increases), suppose that the discounted future increase
in welfare is less than the current decrease. For example, suppose we
were to spend $1 million today to save $100 million in 100 years. If the
discount rate is more than (roughly) 5 percent, this project fails discounted cost-benefit analysis because the present value of the $100
million benefit in 100 years is less than the $1 million cost today.
If we were considering this project, we would be better off engaging in other projects that meet discounted cost-benefit analysis. For
example, we could take the present value of $100 million and invest it
in a project that receives the market rate of return. Future generations
would still get $100 million but the current cost to us would be lower.
Alternatively, we could invest the full $1 million, imposing the same
cost on the current generation, and give future generations more. Either way, at least one generation is better off and nobody is worse off.
Therefore, regardless of whether the project increases welfare, we
should not engage in the project because there are other projects that
increase welfare more. If it were the case that other projects were limited, the analysis might be different, but we can always invest funds at
the market rate.
This argument gives an additional reason why the claim that discounting does not respect future generations as equals is incorrect.
Suppose that we decide to engage in this project on the basis that future generations are equals and, because $100 million is more than $1
million, the project is worthwhile. If we could ask future generations
whether they would want us to engage in this project, they would prefer that we just invest the money at the market rate of return because
they would be better off with such an investment. If respecting future
generations means anything, it should mean respecting our best guess
as to their wishes and helping them as much as feasible. A project that
fails discounted cost-benefit analysis fails this minimal test."
The other case is a project that passes discounted cost-benefit
analysis but which has bad distributional consequences. For example,
it might create benefits for the rich that exceed on a dollar basis the
costs it imposes on the poor but, because the poor feel the pain of the
27 A similar argument is made in Ari Rabl, Discounting of Long-Term Costs: What Would
Future Generations Prefer Us to Do?, 17 Ecol Econ 137, 139 (1996) ("A cost-benefit analysis
from the perspective of future generations implies that the preferred rate ... is the growth rate
... of the economy.").
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loss of a dollar more than the rich feel the benefit of the gain, the project on its own reduces social welfare. Rejecting this project, however,
would be a Pareto dominated decision.
Suppose the project produces benefits of $100 and only costs $90,
both in present value terms. In addition, suppose that the benefits go
to wealthy individuals who, because of declining marginal utility of
wealth, do not value them very much, and the costs are imposed on
poor individuals who view the costs as a large imposition. Although
the project taken alone would seem to reduce welfare, there exists an
offsetting transfer that makes the project a Pareto improvement. In
particular, the wealthy individuals would be willing to give up $95 to
get the project (gaining $5) and the poor would be willing to accept
$95 to agree to the project (gaining $5). Thus, although the project
taken alone reduces welfare, the combination of the project plus the
transfer is a Pareto improvement over rejecting the project.
Future generations, of course, are not yet alive to strike such a
bargain with us, and even if they were alive, no such bargain would be
enforceable. And it is difficult to even imagine a bargain because the
ethical discussion is about the rights and responsibilities of each generation; without a background set of rights and responsibilities, there
cannot easily be a bargain. Without an actual transfer, the project is
merely Kaldor-Hicks efficient and may not be consistent with improving social welfare.
By hypothesis, there is a project on the table that has costs and
benefits to the present and the future. The current generation is entirely in control of the project-it can decide whether to engage in it
entirely without regard to the future.9 Given whatever level of altruism (or selfishness) the current generation has, however, it makes
sense to exercise that altruism in the most efficient fashion. That is, it
never makes sense to throw resources away. Therefore, there need not
be a bargain between generations or an enforcement mechanism for
the Pareto dominance argument to hold.
To illustrate, go back to our example and suppose that the current
generation is rich and the future is expected to be poor, and that, rela28 See Cass Sunstein and Arden Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money,
and IntergenerationalEquity 74 U Chi L Rev 171, 194-95 (2007) (noting that absent a theory of
entitlements and a mechanism for enforcing intergenerational bargains, Pareto allocation cannot
be affected). This is not necessarily the case. Individuals frequently bargain successfully in the
presence of great uncertainty about their underlying rights and responsibilities.
29 Although moral theories can reject, as an ethical matter, the dictatorship of the present,
they cannot reject it as a factual matter. The current generation can make the decision whether
to engage in the project or not. See id at 195 ("[The current generation] can decide to consume
all existing resources, to ruin the environment, to impoverish posterity, even to remain childless
and not create later generations at all.").
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tive to the status quo, the project transfers $100 to the current generation at the expense of $90 to the future generation. Suppose also that
the current generation otherwise plans to transfer $1,000 to the future
because of its altruism. The current generation should engage in the
project and increase its transfer to the future by somewhere between
$90 and $100. The current generation is better off-it meets its altruistic or selfish goals (depending on what one thinks about the transfer
of $1,000) and gets the project. The future generation is also better off.
There is no need for an actual bargain for the transfer to occur. The
current generation could always do the project without the transfer of
$90 to the future, but it could also just reduce the legacy it would oth-

erwise leave from $1,000 to $990.
We can produce similar examples where the current generation is
poor and the future rich, or where the costs and benefits of the project

go in different directions, or where the level of altruism changes. As
long as there are sufficient transfers among generations, these existing
transfers can be altered to make the project a Pareto improvement if
it passes discounted cost-benefit analysis.
The argument is closely related to a theorem from the public finance literature first put forth by Anthony Atkinson and Joseph
Stiglitz. ° They considered the case of optimal redistributive tax and
transfer systems, but their argument has been extended to cost-benefit
analysis and to public goods.' These extensions show that cost-benefit
30 See generally Anthony B. Atkinson and Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Design of Tax Structure:
Direct Versus Indirect Taxation, 6 J Pub Econ 55 (1976).
31 Legal readers are likely to know this theorem from the arguments about the desired
efficiency of legal rules. See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less
Efficient Than the Income Tax in RedistributingIncome, 23 J Legal Stud 667,667 (1994) (arguing
that "redistribution through legal rules offers no advantage over redistribution through the
income tax system and typically is less efficient"); Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal
Income Taxation?, 71 Am Econ Rev 414, 414 (1981) (arguing that even in the face of an imperfect ability to redistribute income through taxation, legal rules chosen only on the basis of their
efficiency should still be strictly preferred). The tax version of this argument has been extensively
discussed in the literature. See Louis Kaplow, On the Undesirabilityof Commodity Taxation Even
When Income Taxation Is Not Optimal, 90 J Pub Econ 1235, 1237-39 (2006) (designing a method
for constructing a Pareto superior tax regime using solely an income tax from an initial regime
that uses a positive commodity tax rate); Emmanuel Saez, The Desirabilityof Commodity Taxation Under Non-Linear Income Taxation and Heterogeneous Tastes, 83 J Pub Econ 217, 218
(2002) (investigating how the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem applies in cases of heterogeneous consumption preferences); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Pareto Efficient and Optimal Taxation and the New
New Welfare Economics, in Alan J. Auerbach and Martin Feldstein, eds, 2 Handbook of Public
Economics 991, 1002-06 (Elsevier Science 1987) (building a model of optimal taxation following
allocative maximization of public spending); Angus Deaton, Optimal Taxes and the Structure of
Preferences,49 Econometrica 1245, 1245-46 (1981) (analyzing how individuals' preference structures affect optimal tax rates). The application to cost-benefit analysis was first suggested by
Aanund Hylland and Richard Zeckhauser. See Aanund Hylland and Richard Zeckhauser, Dis-
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analysis should not, under the conditions of the theorem, be adjusted
for distributional considerations, regardless of how egalitarian we are.
Similarly, the government should purchase public goods without regard to the tax cost of financing them.33
We can use the same example discussed above to illustrate the
argument.Y In the example, rich individuals were made better off by
$100 and the poor worse off by $90. Rather than a voluntary transfer
from the rich to the poor to pay for the project, we would use an identical adjustment to the tax schedule. Suppose we increase the progressivity of the tax system by increasing taxes on the rich by $100 and
reducing taxes on the poor by $90, leaving both classes of individuals
in the same place as without the project and tax adjustment. There are
no distributive effects of the combined project and tax adjustment.
Unlike with the voluntary exchange case considered above, however,
32

taxes might create deadweight losses, such as those caused by a reduc-

tion in labor effort. Note, however, that by leaving each individual in
the same place, the combination of the project and tax adjustment
introduces no distortions into the economy, such as the usual deadweight loss caused by a tax. Finally, because taxes went up on the rich
by $100 and down on the poor by only $90, there is an additional $10
of tax receipts that can be used to make everyone (or some people)
better off, resulting in a Pareto improvement." The conclusion is that
tributionalObjectives Should Affect Taxes But Not Program Choice or Design, 81 Scandinavian J
Econ 264,265 (1979). See also Louis Kaplow, The OptimalSupply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation, 49 Natl Tax J 513, 513 (1996) (examining the relationship between
the optimal supply of public goods and the distortionary cost of income taxation).
32
Hylland and Zeckhauser, 81 Scandinavian J Econ at 274-76 (cited in note 31) (proving
that in instances where optimal taxation is available, the choice between competing government
programs should be made solely on the basis of the programs' respective net benefits and not
based on distributional considerations).
33
See Kaplow, 49 Natl Tax J at 524 (cited in note 31) (explaining that "under standard
simplifying assumptions, there exists a way to modify the income tax to finance a public good
such that there is no additional distortion").
34 See Atkinson and Stiglitz, 6 J Pub Econ at 56 (citc in note 30) (proposing that under a
relatively wide class of conditions, "the optimal tax system -an rely solely on income taxation");
Kaplow, 90 J Pub Econ at 1236 (cited in note 31) (extending the Atkinson-Stiglitz conclusion that
the social welfare optimum can rely solely on income taxation to cases in which the income tax is
not set at an optimal level); Kaplow, 49 Natl Tax J at 514 (cited in note 31) ("[T]he simple costbenefit formula indicates whether the public good should be supplied. There should be no adjustment to account for the distortionary cost of labor income taxation."); Kaplow and Shavell,
23 J Legal Stud at 677 (cited in note 31) ("[I]t is appropriate for economic analysis of legal rules
to focus on efficiency and ignore the distribution of income in offering normative judgments.");
Hylland and Zeckhauser, 81 Scandinavian J Econ at 266 (cited in note 31) (developing a model
proving that distributional objectives can be achieved through the tax system alone rather than
through the pursuit of redistributional goals, and therefore, government programs should be
chosen solely on the basis of efficiency criteria).
35 Sophisticated readers are probably thinking at this point of "the theorem of the second
best," which states that distortion counting of the sort in the text cannot be used for welfare
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as long as the tax system is sufficiently flexible to make offsetting distributional adjustments, projects should be undertaken if and only if
they pass unweighted cost-benefit analysis.
This conclusion, usually stated for projects with present costs and
benefits, also applies to projects with costs and benefits spread over
time and between generations. As long as the discounted costs are less
than the discounted benefits, there exists an offsetting tax and transfer
adjustment that makes everyone better off, even if the project taken
alone seems to have bad distributional effects. Therefore, the approanalysis.3
priate decision criteria for projects is discounted cost-benefit
III. COUNTERARGUMENTS
The Pareto dominance arguments have long been recognized in the
literature, but, we believe, have not been uniformly accepted because of
a variety of objections. We consider some of these objections here.
A. Intervening Generations
One of the most common counterarguments to the Pareto dominance argument is that intervening generations may abscond with any
savings that we intended to leave for distant future generations.37 Lind
offers a particularly emphatic version, arguing: "[I]ntergenerational
transfers, either forward or backward, generally must be made through
series of intervening generations. Designing and implementing such
analysis. One of their assumptions, namely weak separability between labor and leisure, eliminates this problem. Relaxing this assumption means that it is possible that the tax on the commodity reduces the distortion in labor supply caused by the labor income tax. The commodity,
for example, might be a relative complement to leisure. In practice, the possibility of taxing relative complements to leisure is obscure and has few if any implications for intergenerational
projects. See Joseph Bankman and David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption

Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 Stanford L Rev 1413, 1451-52 (2006) (arguing that saving, and
by implication future consumption, is not a complement to leisure).
36 There is a subtlety. In prior literature advocating tax offsets, the tax affected the margin
but was offset by the benefit (or cost) of the project on the margin. See Kaplow, 90 J Pub Econ at
1236-37 (cited in note 31) (proposing a method for constructing a Pareto optimal tax regime that
relies solely on income taxation); Hylland and Zeckhauser, 81 Scandinavian J Econ at 266 (cited
in note 31) (proposing a method for financing allocatively optimal public spending without
additional labor supply distortion). For example, suppose that the benefit of the project goes up
linearly with income. Increasing the income tax to the same extent will not distort labor effort
because if an individual works harder he gets both the benefit of increased enjoyment from the
project and increased taxes. In the intergenerational context, both the tax and the project costs
and benefits are more lump sum. For example, suppose that the current generation must transfer
$100 to a future generation because a project benefits us by $100. Assuming that the transfer will
be made, the tax cannot be avoided by working less or by anything of the like, and the same goes
for the benefit of the project.
37
See Sunstein and Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits 74 U Chi L Rev at 193-94
(cited in note 28) (offering a hypothetical in which a present generation confiscates resources from
a future generation).
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transfers is virtually impossible, and the potential for an intervening
generation to break the chain of transfer makes such transfer schemes
virtually impossible to implement.""
Lind goes on to dramatize the point by hypothesizing a proposal
to transfer resources to the future through an investment with a 0 percent rate of return, at a time when money or other projects earn a 10
percent return:
The preferred decision may well be to make that investment and
transfer the resources to the future generation even though it
earns a zero rate of return. At this point an eager graduate student
jumps up, sensing an economic slam dunk, and says, "that was a
really dumb decision. You could have invested that money at 10%
and made those people a lot better off" Wrong! We don't know
how to set aside investment funds and to commit intervening generations to investing and reinvesting those funds for eventual delivery as consumer goods to the generation 200 years from now."
It is Lind, however, and not the eager graduate student who is
wrong. The reason why is that any project, including the project being
analyzed such as Lind's zero rate of return project, can be destroyed
by an intervening generation. Absent a reason to believe that transfers
from one project are less easily misdirected than transfers from others,
we should still pick the project with the highest rate of return.
For example, suppose we are considering conserving petroleum
for use in two hundred years, and the rate of return on this project is
less than the market rate of return. We should not engage in the project because other projects would confer more value on future generations for less money. If we are worried about intervening generations
with respect to the alternative projects, we have to worry that intervening generations will interfere with the project at issue, say by using
up the petroleum themselves. Similarly, if we are considering transferring resources to a future generation by abating global warming, an
intervening generation could always take the transfer for itself by releasing excess carbon into the air, destroying our attempt to preserve
the resource for the future.
Lind and others who make this claim, however, do not make the
necessary institutional arguments about the ability of future generations to interfere with some forms of transfer but not others. They give
no more reason to believe that intervening generations will respect an
environmental choice than they would leave money in the bank or in

38

Lind, Analysis for IntergenerationalDecisionmaking at 174-75 (cited in note 14).

39

Id at 176.
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another type of project. They assume, nonetheless, that this would be
the case-environmental projects (or whatever unstated projects are
uppermost in the analyst's mind) are assumed to be feasible methods of
transferring resources while other projects with a market rate of return
are assumed to be infeasible methods of transferring resources. While it
is possible (indeed likely) that some transfers are more easily reversed
than others, such a claim is not sufficiently general to reject discounting.
Arguments about which transfers cannot be undone are likely to be
very project-specific and do not systematically disfavor discounting.'
Moreover, it is not clear that tying the hands of intervening generations would be wise. We can imagine that intervening generations are
more, equally, or less altruistic to the future than we are. If they are
more altruistic than the current generation or equally so, Lind's argument presents no issue. If they are less altruistic, we would have to ask
why. It could be the case that they have discovered new and better ethical theories and are behaving consistently with those theories. We
should probably want to respect that choice. Alternatively, they might
merely be selfish or have adopted worse ethical theories, in which case
we might want to tie their hands. If we can successfully tie the hands of
future generations (by engaging in one particular project but not in others), however, we would prevent both the unwise generation from reneging and the wise generation from improving. Thus, even if we could
establish, on a project-by-project basis, which projects are less subject to
reneging, it is not clear that engaging in those projects would be wise.
The discounted cost-benefit analysis assumes that transfers to or
from the future can be made at the market rate of return. This is a
good first-best baseline from which to think about the issue. To incorporate Lind's arguments, future work would have to make institutional or second-best arguments, trying to distinguish which types of
projects are better or worse from a commitment standpoint. We see no
particular reason why such an analysis would favor the types of longterm projects currently discussed, such as global warming abatement
or prevention of species extinction, although it might. (To be sure,
these projects may very well pass discounted cost-benefit analysis in
any event. We take no position on that issue.)
B.

Difficulty of Transfers

A common reaction to the Atkinson and Stiglitz tax argument
when applied to projects is that the scope of most projects is too nar40 See K.J. Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equity, Discounting, and Economic Efficiency, in
James P. Bruce, Hoesung Lee, and Erik R Haites, eds, Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social
Dimensions of Climate Change 125,132 (Cambridge 1996).
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row (and the scope of taxation too broad) for such adjustments to be
made. For example, we might be deciding whether to build a highway
that produces noise and pollution next to a poor neighborhood and
benefiting those rich persons who happen to use it as their commuting
route. Broad-based tax adjustments will not be able to tax those particular commuters and benefit those particular residents affected by
the project. But if we are talking about large scale intergenerational
issues-the only kind worth our attention-this objection goes away.
The relative redistribution is between current and future generations
rather than particular individuals. (To be sure, even large scale projects will have narrow effects. The costs of reducing global warming
will not fall on all Americans equally. But intergenerational equity is
not usually concerned with these intragenerational issues.)
Another objection frequently made is that the offsetting tax adjustments might not be made, for purely political reasons such as the
separation of powers in the U.S. system. For example, Adler and Posner observe that an agency deciding whether to pursue a project does
not have the choice of making offsetting tax adjustments. 1 It is hard to
see why the adjustments would not be made, however, at least on an
economy-wide, systematic basis. Positing that projects will have good
distributional effects but taxes cannot be adjusted to have the same
effects requires very strong assumptions about the political process,
assumptions that are unlikely to hold systematically. Instead, it is better
to assume that the political process produces some equilibrium amount
of redistribution, which may or may not be optimal. More importantly,
these sorts of objections have no bearing on large scale intergenerational projects. Any project that has sufficient redistributive impact to
be worth our attention is going to have legislative involvement, and the
legislature clearly has power over both the project and taxes.
The main assumption made by the theorem that might affect its
application to intergenerational projects is that the tax and transfer
system can be adjusted to offset the effect of the project. If a project is
going to impose costs today and produce benefits in two hundred
years, we must be able to adjust taxes and transfers between these two
generations to offset any distributional implications. Leaving aside the
"intervening generation" problem discussed above, there should clearly
be sufficient intergenerational transfers that can be adjusted. Suppose,
for example, we are going to incur costs today to help those in two
hundred years, and we believe that individuals in two hundred years
41 See Adler and Posner, 29 J Legal Stud at 1138 (cited in note 9) ("We know of no agency
in the U.S. government that has the authority to order wealth transfers, and there are many good
reasons for denying them this authority.").
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will be systematically better off. The project would redistribute in the
wrong direction, helping those who are better off. To offset this redistribution, the project could be deficit financed or other taxes could be
reduced. The legacy each generation leaves to the next is enormous,
and there is no reason to believe that adjustments to offset bad distributional consequences of projects would not be available.
The most serious objection to the above analysis is that the tax
and transfer system is not sufficiently flexible to transfer resources to
or take resources from future generations of individuals in other nations. For example, abating global warming may impose costs on the
current U.S. generation and help future foreigners. This seems a valid
objection. There are ways to redistribute to and from future foreigners
by adjusting foreign aid, military spending, and the like, but there is
nothing very direct and efficient.
If we were to weight future foreigners in our social welfare function at the same weight as current locals, and if a given project is the
best way of transferring resources to poor future foreigners, it would
be welfare-improving to adopt the project. For example, the argument
would be that the United States should incur costs today to abate
global warming because doing so is the best way to help future foreigners. That is, those arguing against discounting must directly confront Schelling's argument that most long-term projects are really foreign aid projects."
As noted, foreigners are barely weighted in a U.S. social welfare
function derived from actual behavior. 3 If we weight foreigners equally,
current projects would have to be changed so dramatically that most
long-term projects, such as global warming abatement, would no longer
be near the top of our priority list. Alternatively, if we take our current
valuation of foreigners, we would vastly discount their lives in our social
welfare function, and most projects of a global scale such as global
warming abatement would not remotely pass cost-benefit analysis.
For example, suppose we are considering a project that will cost
the current generation living in the United States $100 and help a future generation of poor foreigners by a present value amount of $90,
and that because of distributional considerations, the benefits to the
future foreigners are more than costs to current U.S. lives. Our argument above was that the project should be rejected because it is better
to transfer $90 directly. Suppose, however, that no direct transfer will
See generally Schelling, 23 Energy Policy 395 (cited in note 15).
See Kopczuk, Slemrod, and Yitzhaki, 40 Eur Econ Rev at 1054 (cited in note 18) (finding
that the level of U.S. foreign aid is consistent with foreigners "being valued by the U.S. at just 16
percent of an average American, with the citizens of the poorest countries weighted by as little as
1/20th of 1 percent").
42

43
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be made, so that the optimal tax argument does not apply. It still
makes no sense to spend $100 to transfer the $90. If we are unwilling
to transfer $90 directly (spending $90 to transfer $90), we should not
transfer $90 by spending $100. To suggest that we really do want to
transfer the $90 and that the only way to do so is to engage in a project costing $100, while possible, seems implausible.
Another way to look at this issue is to compare the Pareto analysis with a welfarist analysis. The example presented immediately
above was a Pareto analysis. For any given level of transfers to foreigners, it should be done efficiently. A welfarist would not be happy
with this because a welfarist would insist on the right level of transfers
to foreigners, a level likely to be significantly higher than current
transfers. Such a welfarist might then have a valid argument that the
distributive effects of the project must be considered rather than
merely using discounted cost-benefit analysis. At the same time, however, the welfarist might be more concerned about our current level of
foreign aid or the current distribution of resources in the world.
C. Difference between Opportunity Costs and Discounting
Many commentators have argued that taking opportunity costs
into account is not the same as discounting." Others have argued that
it is not appropriate to take opportunity costs into account. We consider these arguments in this Part.
Taking opportunity costs into account presumably means taking
into account the alternative uses of resources that we are considering
using for a project. This is equivalent to taking the future value of
these resources at the highest rate of return available. There is, however, a perfect mathematical equivalence between discounting and
taking future values. Algebraically, the two are the same, and any project that passes (fails) discounted cost-benefit analysis passes (fails)
future valued cost-benefit analysis.
Everyone knows this, so commentators arguing that opportunity
costs should be taken into account but projects not discounted must
44 See, for example, Cowen and Parfit, Against the Social DiscountRate at 152 (cited in note
2) ("Although certain opportunity costs do increase over time, it misrepresents our moral reasoning to treat these opportunity costs in terms of a social discount rate. These costs should be considered directly. If instead we express these costs in terms of a discount rate, we can be led astray.").
45 See, for example, William R. Cline, Discounting for the Very Long Term, in Portney and
Weyant, eds, Discounting and IntergenerationalEquity 131, 134 (cited in note 1):

The fundamental problem with discounting the very long term at today's rate of return on
capital is that to do so... promises something that cannot be delivered: that today's generation and all intervening generations will keep intact an investment fund that is capable of
continued real returns at today's level.
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have something else in mind. A significant possibility is that they are
focusing on reasons for discounting other than the opportunity cost of
capital. For example, some have suggested that interest rates are positive because of impatience (pure time preference) or because of the
possibility of a catastrophe (better to consume the resources than
have them destroyed in the catastrophe). In this paper we do not consider these rationales for discounting and, therefore, need not consider
whether they are appropriate. Note that this means the discounting
argued for here would be at a lower rate than the market rate of interest because the market rate of interest will reflect factors other
than opportunity costs.6
Derek Parfit gives four reasons why the existence of opportunity
costs does not support discounting." First, he argues that some benefits are consumed rather than reinvested. He posits the enjoyment
each year of a stretch of countryside, arguing that enjoyment in later
years should not count less than enjoyment in earlier years. Consumption, however, can be thought of as a stream of money-the willingness to pay or accept. If the value to an individual of the countryside
in ten years is $100, the individual would accept less than $100 today
to give up the enjoyment of the countryside in ten years. There is no
difference between consumption items that are consumed and those
that are reinvested.
John Broome draws a conclusion similar to Parfit's from the same
example, although for different reasons.4' Broome generally favors
discounting on a theory closely analogous to the opportunity cost arguments made here. Broome argues that because of the productivity
of capital, most commodities will be cheaper in the future -this is why
there is a positive rate of interest and why commodities should be discounted. For example, producing televisions gets cheaper, so the market prices of televisions today and in the future are different. He uses
the idea of a commodity's "own interest rate" as the rate of change of
the price of the commodity. One should agree to pay less for future
televisions than today's televisions because of this "fertility" of capital.
Open countryside, however, is not fertile: "Scarce resources cannot be
converted into a greater quantity of future resources, and they therefore
have own interest rates of zero or thereabouts."9 If the value of a commodity will remain the same through time, it should not be discounted.
46 See, for example, Rabl, 17 Ecol Econ at 138-39 (cited in note 27) (arguing on similar
grounds for a long-term discount rate that reflects the expected growth in the economy rather
than recently observed interest rates).
47 See Parfit, Reasons and Persons at 483 (cited in note 5).
48 See John Broome, Discountingthe Future,23 Phil & Pub Aff 128,148 (1994).
49

Id.
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This argument is consistent with the opportunity-costs arguments
made here. If the absolute value of the scarce resource remains the
same but other resources get cheaper, the relative price of the scarce
resource will go up. Indeed, this is why we can think of there being a
single interest rate in the economy notwithstanding each commodity
having its own "fertility." Therefore, one can reframe Broome's argument as an argument that a consistent opportunity-cost discount factor should be used, but that it should be based on relative future prices.
If the price of the scarce resource goes up at the same rate as the discount factor, the net effect of determining the future price and discounting it back is zero. If the price of the resource goes up faster than the
discount rate, the net effect is like having a negative discount factor.
Does it matter which procedure is used-not discounting (or
more precisely, determining a commodity's own rate of interest) or
determining future prices and discounting-if the net effect is the
same? In a technical sense, the answer is "no." All we care about is
making the welfare-maximizing decisions. Rhetorically, however, commentators such as Parfit use these sorts of arguments as a wedge to
argue against discounting more generally. It is important to realize
that these arguments are not inconsistent with discounting.'
Parfit's second argument is that many harms will not be compensated. He considers the case of a pollutant that will cause congenital
deformities among some unlucky future individuals and assumes that
they will not be compensated. There are two distinct elements in the
example. The first is similar to the countryside example above. A deformity tomorrow reduces welfare just as much as a deformity in the
future, so deformities may not be like commodities that get cheaper
over time. The same answer given above applies and, in fact, the case
might be easier, because the cost of care or cost of a cure for deformi50 Moreover, Broome's underlying assumption, that some goods are scarce and, therefore,
their price will go up over time at least as fast as the overall discount rate, is also controversial.
Julian Simon and his critics have been debating this for more than thirty years without apparent
resolution. Compare Julian L. Simon, The Ultimate Resource 27 (Princeton 1981), with Paul R.
Ehrlich, An Economist in Wonderland, 62 Soc Sci 0 44, 46 (1981). Even if one disagrees with
Simon, and many do, at a minimum he is correct that it is difficult to make a prediction like
Broome's, that the price of a given scarce commodity will go up over time. For example, Parfit
and Broome use open countryside as their illustration. It is difficult to determine the price of
open countryside because the term has no precise meaning. One possibility is that open country-

side is any land that is neither urban nor farm. Data show that the amount of nonurban, nonfarm
land in the continental U.S. has increased in the last half century. Since 1945, urban areas have
grown by roughly 69,000 square miles. Since 1950, farmland has decreased by almost 360,000
square miles. See Demographia, Urbanizationand Urban Densitiesin the United States from 1945
(2005), online at http://www.demographia.com/db-1945uza.htm (visited Jan 23, 2007); USDA
National Agricultural Statistics Service, Trends in US Agriculture, online at http://www.usda.gov/
nass/pubs/trends/farmnumbers.htm (visited Jan 23,2007).
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ties is likely to go down over time, implying that there is an "own interest rate." 1 Second, there is the issue of noncompensation. This argument does not distinguish opportunity costs from discounting more
generally. The arguments about the need for compensation and the
likelihood of providing compensation were discussed above. It is our
view that for large-scale projects, compensation can be provided, at
least for within-country effects.
Third, Parfit argues that, in some time periods, there will be no
opportunity costs because investment will bring no return. While this
is possible, it is a technical economics question to estimate the likely
opportunity costs, not an ethical question about whether discounting
is appropriate in the presence of those costs."
Finally, Parfit argues that the rhetoric of discounting is inappropriate and that a project's costs and benefits should be expressed in a
"more temporally neutral way."53 This same idea is echoed by Lisa
Heinzerling and Richard Revesz. " For example, Heinzerling objects to
the language of opportunity costs and future values because it "elides
... moral issues.""5 Revesz claims that discounting the utilities of future
generations is the objective function of a specific ethical theory while
"paying attention to opportunity costs does not imply the choice of
any particular theory."' 6 We fail to see how one mathematical procedure can present different moral issues than another identical mathematical procedure. If the issue is about presenting information to decisionmakers or the public in a way that helps inform them, we are in
favor of such a presentation, but nothing in these discussions makes a
serious case that one form of presentation is better in this regard than
another. Our intuition is that discounting is likely to be more informa51 Broome, 23 Phil & Pub Aff at 149-50 (cited in note 48) (observing that the medical costs
of saving a life are decreasing).
52
See Cowen and Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate at 151 (cited in note 2) (arguing
that opportunity costs cannot be used to justify the use of a discount rate because the marginal
productivity of capital depends on other social decisions, most notably, the savings rate). Within
this analysis, however, the distribution of wealth across generations is held constant when making project choices. Project choice, therefore, will not affect the discount rate, at least in any
direct way. See Louis Kaplow, DiscountingDollars;Discounting Lives: IntergenerationalDistributive Justice and Efficiency, 74 U Chi L Rev 79, 111-12 (2007) (explaining that when intergenerational wealth distribution is held constant the market interest rate, and hence the discount rate,
would also be constant and the choice of projects should be made solely on the grounds of efficiency).
53
Parfit, Reasons and Personsat 484 (cited in note 5).
54
Heinzerling, 108 Yale L J at 1911 (cited in note 9) (arguing that resolutions to questions
of environmental law "do not turn on financial rates of return, and resort to such figures will
obscure rather than illuminate the relevant concerns"); Revesz, 99 Colum L Rev at 1008 (cited in
note 5).
55 Heinzerling, 108 Yale L J at 1911 (cited in note 9).
56
Revesz, 99 Colum L Rev at 1008 (cited in note 5).
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tive because it presents all information using current dollars, which
policymakers can easily understand.
In sum, the only merit to the position that discounting and taking
opportunity costs into account are not the same is with respect to reasons for discounting unrelated to the productivity of capital, such as
impatience. Claims that taking opportunity costs into account is different from discounting are erroneous.
IV. ADDITIONAL ISSUES

There is a large technical literature on determining the correct discount rate. Issues arise such as wedges between the return to consumption and the return to investment, adjusting for risk, and estimating future productivity.57 Martin Weitzman, for example, presents arguments
for a low discount rate based on how one aggregates the probabilities of
various discount rates in the future. 8 These arguments are very important-changing the discount rate even a small amount can change
whether many projects pass cost-benefit analysis. Nevertheless, they are
technical in nature-they do not have to do with the propriety of discounting.
Another issue is whether it is appropriate to discount life. Many
commentators object to discounting life but not money.9 As should be
apparent from the discussion so far, we do not believe that discounting
for opportunity costs involves discounting future lives. Future lives are
weighed equally to current lives and a loss of a future life reduces social
welfare just like loss of a current life. What we propose to discount is
expenditures and receipts, or in the case of projects that directly affect
°
utility without market intermediation, their monetary equivalents.
Another common argument is that discounting is inappropriate
when there are significant irreversibilities, such as in the case of global
warming or extinction of a species. The right approach to irreversibilities, however, is not to refuse to discount. Instead, it is to use real op57
See Richard W. Tresch, Public Finance:A Normative Theory 733-56 (Academic 2d ed
2002) (summarizing challenges to finding the right discount rate).
58
Martin L. Weitzman, Gamma Discounting,91 Am Econ Rev 260, 261 (2001) (utilizing
the sur ey responses of over two thousand economists to construct a sliding-scale discount rate
that decreases drastically the farther into the future costs and benefits are projected).
59 See Revesz, 99 Colum L Rev at 1008-09 (cited in note 5) (distinguishing between discounting future generations' utility and accepting the growth of capital). See also Heinzerling,
108 Yale L J at 1913 (cited in note 9) (arguing that because life is nonfungible it does not "compound the way money does" and hence is not subject to discounting).
60 See Sunstein and Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits, 74 U Chi L Rev at 182-83
(cited in note 28) (emphasizing that administrative agencies deciding whether and how to deploy
welfare enhancing resources are informed by willingness to pay measures, which are inherently in
dollar units).
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tion theory." This theory takes into account the problem of lost opportunities, or sunk investments. It also fully incorporates discounting
(necessarily so because it is attempting to model when to incur an irreversible cost). Although we must be cautious about irreversible actions, refusing to discount is unlikely to get the right result.
Finally, we should say a word about rhetoric. Because of the
power of discounting it is easy to come up with rhetorical quips that
make discounting seem unattractive. Frank Ackerman and Lisa
Heinzerling object that with "a discount rate of five percent, for example, the death of a billion people 500 years from now becomes less
serious than the death of one person today."62 As noted, our favorite is
Cowen and Parfit's statement: "Imagine finding out that you, having
just reached your twenty-first birthday, must soon die of cancer because one evening Cleopatra wanted an extra helping of dessert."''
Many of the claims comparing stubbing one's toe to blowing up
the world implicitly depend on discount rates over long periods of
time that are far higher than possible. If the discount rate used is
greater than the long-run growth rate of the economy, a project of any
size will, with sufficient time, be worth more than all the wealth in the
world, an obvious contradiction (the project would be part of the
world so it could not be worth more than the world). Under the argument we make here, long-run discount rates should instead be limited
to expected long-run economic growth because this is the true opportunity cost. 6' With more appropriate discount rates, current costs will
not grow to implausible sizes in the long-run future. If a cost is, say, 1
percent of the current economy, discounting will keep it at 1 percent
of the future economy. Stubbing one's toe remains stubbing one's toe.
Moreover, what these quips miss is that discounting provides for
Pareto superior outcomes. Failure to make decisions following discounted cost-benefit analysis means throwing resources away to nobody's benefit. For example, the reverse of Cowen and Parfit's problem arises if one looks forward rather than backwards. Suppose that
you are going to spend a dollar today. That dollar will grow to a billion, a trillion, or more dollars with enough time. Spending that dollar
today means taking that money from the future. To paraphrase Cowen
For an accessible explanation of real option theory, see generally Avinash K. Dixit and
61
Robert S. Pindyck, Investment Under Uncertainty (Princeton 1994).
62
Ackerman and Heinzerling, 150 U Pa L Rev at 1571 (cited in note 3).
63
Cowen and Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate at 145 (cited in note 2).
64 This is the approach adopted in Rabl, 17 Ecol Econ at 139 (cited in note 27) (explaining
that the conventional social discount rate treats the time-preference component of the discount
rate as if it represented creation of wealth rather than only redistribution, and therefore, that
only the growth component of the discount rate is relevant to a cost-benefit analysis).
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and Parfit, every time you eat a banana, you condemn a million people in the future to death.
CONCLUSION

We conclude that discounting by the opportunity cost of capital is
generally appropriate and Pareto dominates any other decision procedure. The most difficult case is where a project transfers significant
amounts to or from future foreigners and where it is difficult to make
those transfers or offsetting transfers in any other way.

